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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
STAPLETON, Circuit Judge: 
 
In this case we must determine whether the Ex Post 
Facto Clause of the United States Constitution is violated 
when, upon revocation of supervised release, a defendant is 
sentenced to a new term of supervised release, even though 
such a new term was not authorized at the time the 
defendant committed his underlying criminal offense. We 
conclude that retroactive application of 18 U.S.C. § 3583(h), 
which authorizes imposition of supervised release following 
revocation of a prior term of supervised release, increases 
the potential punishment for violations of supervised 
release and, therefore, violates the constitutional 
prohibition on ex post facto legislation. We will vacate the 





Appellant Keith Dozier was convicted in 1992 of the class 
D felony of conspiracy to transport stolen motor vehicles 
across state lines. See 18 U.S.C. § 371; id. at § 2313. In 
June 1992, he was sentenced to 34 months in prison to be 
followed by 36 months of supervised release--the maximum 
term of supervised release that could be imposed on a 
defendant convicted of a class C or D felony. 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3583(b)(2). Dozier completed his period of imprisonment 
in October 1994 and then began his 36 months of 
supervised release. 
 
In September 1996, Dozier pled guilty to various 
violations of his conditions of supervised release. His 
supervised release was revoked in November 1996 and he 
was sentenced again. Given Dozier's criminal history 
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category of IV, and the fact that his supervised release 
violations were grade C, the Sentencing Guidelines 
recommended a sentence of six to twelve months of 
imprisonment. See U.S.S.G. 7B1.4. The district court 
sentenced Dozier to six months of prison to be followed by 
a new, 24-month term of supervised release. Together, the 
total length of sentence imposed upon revocation of Dozier's 
supervised release was 30 months. 
 
The district court sentenced Dozier pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3583(h), which expressly permits the imposition of a new 
term of supervised release upon revocation of an earlier 
term of supervised release. However, § 3583(h) was not 
enacted until September 13, 1994, more than two years 
after Dozier committed his original offense of conviction. 
Although Dozier did not argue before the district court that 
application of § 3583(h) violated the Ex Post Facto Clause, 
he brought this timely appeal to press that argument in 
this court. We may only vacate Dozier's sentence if we find 
that the district court committed plain error. See Fed. R. 




The Ex Post Facto Clause of the Constitution states that 
"no ex post facto Law shall be passed." Art. I, § 9, cl. 3. 
"Two conditions must be satisfied before a law can be 
deemed to transgress the ex post facto prohibition. First, 
the law `must be retrospective, that is, it must apply to 
events occurring before its enactment.' Second, the change 
in the law must `alter[ ] the definition of criminal conduct or 
increase[ ] the penalty by which a crime is punishable.' " 
United States v. Brady, 88 F.3d 225, 228 (3d Cir. 1996), 
cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 773 (1997) (citations omitted); see 
also California Dept. of Corrections v. Morales, 115 S. Ct. 
1597 (1995). 
 
The government concedes that the retrospective 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The district court had jurisdiction over this federal criminal case 
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231. We have jurisdiction over this timely 
appeal from the imposition of a sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 
and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a). 
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requirement is met here, and we see no reason to reject this 
concession. A sentence imposed upon revocation of 
supervised release is most properly viewed as a 
consequence of the original criminal conviction. See United 
States v. Beals, 87 F.3d 854, 859-60 (7th Cir. 1996) 
(concluding that sentence imposed for violation of 
supervised release must be considered punishment for 
original crime because conduct violating supervised release 
need not itself be criminal to be punished, and because 
these violations need only be proven by preponderance of 
evidence); United States v. Woodrup, 86 F.3d 359, 361 (4th 
Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 332 (1996) (reaching same 
conclusion); United States v. Soto-Olivas, 44 F.3d 788, 791 
(9th Cir. 1995) (same); United States v. Meeks, 25 F.3d 
1117, 1123 (2d Cir. 1994) (same); Commentary, U.S.S.G. 
Ch. 7, Pt. A, para. 3(b) (describing violation of supervised 
release as "breach of trust" in connection with original 
sentence); but see United States v. Reese, 71 F.3d 582, 587- 
90 (6th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 2529 (1996) 
(concluding that because defendants have notice of 
potential penalties for violations of supervised release at 
time they commit these violations, such penalties are for 
those violations and not for underlying criminal offense). 
Therefore, to sentence Dozier under § 3583(h) is to 
retrospectively apply a law passed in 1994 to criminal 
conduct that occurred in 1992. 
 
The issue we will focus our attention on is whether the 
concededly retrospective application of § 3583(h) increases 
the penalty to which Dozier is subject for revocation of his 
supervised release. We must compare the penalty Dozier 
could have received prior to passage of § 3583(h) with the 
penalty he could have received after its passage. If under 
§ 3583(h) Dozier may potentially be given a sentence 
constituting an increased penalty over the maximum he 
could have received prior to § 3583(h), then application of 
that statute to him constituted an ex post facto violation. 
See Miller v. Florida, 482 U.S. 423, 432 (1987) (rejecting 
contention that there is no ex post facto violation when 
defendant cannot definitively show that he would have 
received lesser sentence under old statute); Lindsey v. 
Washington, 301 U.S. 397, 401 (1937) ("[A]n increase in the 
possible penalty is ex post facto, regardless of the length of 
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the sentence actually imposed, [when] the measure of 
punishment prescribed by the later statute is more severe 
than that of the earlier . . . .") (citations omitted). 
 
When Dozier committed his offense of conviction in 1992, 
the sentencing court's sentencing options upon revocation 
of a term of supervised release were limited to those 
specified in 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e). Section § 3583(e)(3) 
provided, in relevant part, that the court could "require the 
person to serve in prison all or part of the term of 
supervised release without credit for the time previously 
served on postrelease supervision . . . except that a person 
whose term is revoked under this paragraph may not be 
required to serve . . . more than 2 years in prison if the 
offense was a class C or D felony." We have concluded that 
§ 3583(e) did not permit imposition of a new term of 
supervised release as part of a sentence imposed upon 
revocation of the initial term of supervised release. See 
United States v. Malesic, 18 F.3d 205 (3d Cir. 1994). Hence, 
had Dozier's supervised release been revoked prior to the 
passage of § 3583(h), the district court could only have 
sentenced him to prison, for any period up to and including 
24 months. No new term of supervised release could have 
been imposed. 
 
Section 3583(h) was enacted in September 1994. It 
provides: 
 
When a term of supervised release is revoked and the 
defendant is required to serve a term of imprisonment 
that is less than the maximum term of imprisonment 
authorized under subsection (e)(3), the court may 
include a requirement that the defendant be placed on 
a term of supervised release after imprisonment. The 
length of such a term of supervised release shall not 
exceed the term of supervised release authorized by 
statute for the offense that resulted in the original term 
of supervised release, less any term of imprisonment 
that was imposed upon revocation of supervised 
release. 
 
18 U.S.C. § 3583(h). 
 
Under § 3583(h), the sentencing court has far greater 
sentencing flexibility than it had under § 3583(e) alone. As 
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before, the court may still sentence someone whose 
criminal offense was a class D felony to any period of 
imprisonment up to and including 24 months, as provided 
under § 3583(e). In addition, if the court sentences such a 
defendant to less than 24 months imprisonment, then the 
court may also impose a new term of supervised release to 
follow that imprisonment. Together, the length of the 
imprisonment and the new supervised release can extend to 
a total of 36 months, i.e. the maximum term of supervised 
release authorized under § 3583(b)(2) for a class D felony. 
 
Sentencing Dozier pursuant to § 3583(h) and not just 
pursuant to § 3583(e) affected the sentence to which he was 
subject in at least two important respects. First, it allowed 
imposition of a new term of supervised release, whereas 
prior to § 3583(h) Dozier would have been free of all 
supervision following any incarceration the court might 
impose. Second, it allowed the court to impose a "total 
package" of penalties stretching to 36 months--the 
maximum period of supervised release authorized under 
§ 3583(b)(2)--rather than only 24 months--the maximum 
period of incarceration authorized under § 3583(e)(3). Here, 
for example, the district court sentenced Dozier to six 
months in prison followed by 24 months of supervised 
release for a total package of 30 months, while without 
§ 3583(h) it could have only penalized Dozier for 24 months.2 
 
These effects of § 3583(h) "increase the penalty" to which 
Dozier is subject. Supervised release is punishment; it is a 
deprivation of some portion of one's liberty imposed as a 
punitive measure for a bad act. A defendant on supervised 
release is subject to various terms and conditions which 
restrict his freedom and which make him vulnerable to 
further punishment should he violate them. Such 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Dozier argues that § 3583(h) increases the punishment to which he is 
subject in a third respect as well: the new term of supervised release 
gives rise to the possibility of a second revocation of supervised release, 
for which Dozier could again be sentenced to some combination of 
imprisonment and yet another term of supervised release. Because we 
conclude that the second term of supervised release and the potential for 
a lengthier "total package" are alone enough to increase the penalty to 
which Dozier was exposed, we need not pass judgment on this additional 
contention. 
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subsequent punishment may again include more 
imprisonment and more supervised release. The length of 
the "total package," therefore, is the length of time the 
defendant suffers either a total or substantial deprivation of 
his liberty. It is the measure of the period to which he is 
subject to government supervision. Increasing that length 
from a maximum of 24 months to a maximum of 36 
months clearly increases the penalty authorized upon 
revocation of supervised release. 
 
The government insists that we must balance against 
these detriments to Dozier the fact that the court must 
sentence Dozier to less than the maximum period of 
incarceration if it wishes to impose a new term of 
supervised release. Because incarceration is a more severe 
punishment than supervised release, the government 
continues, the greater likelihood of receiving less than the 
maximum authorized period of imprisonment is the most 
important effect of § 3583(h), and that effect alone 
demonstrates that § 3583(h) will frequently not hurt 
defendants in Dozier's position. 
 
This reasoning, however, cannot justify retrospective 
application of § 3583(h) to Dozier. Contrary to the 
government's suggestion, there has been no reduction in 
the maximum prison term to which Dozier is exposed. He 
could be sentenced to 24 months imprisonment following 
passage of § 3583(h), just as he could have been prior to its 
passage. Retrospective application of § 3583(h) violates the 
ex post facto prohibition if there is the potential that such 
application may even once result in a harsher sentence 
than previously authorized. The possibility that post- 
3583(h) sentences may frequently be less onerous than 
otherwise is insufficient to redeem the statute. It is true, as 
the government emphasizes, that if the sentencing court 
wants to impose a new term of supervised release it must 
impose less than the 24-month maximum term of 
imprisonment. But in exchange for sentencing Dozier to 
just one day less than 24 months of prison the court can 
impose up to 12 additional months (plus one day) of 
supervised release. We have no doubt that a sentence of 23 
months and 29 days in prison followed by 12 months and 
a day of supervised release is a greater penalty than 24 
months in prison. 
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We also reject the government's contention that we are 
precluded from finding an ex post facto violation here by 
virtue of our decision in Brady, 88 F.3d at 225. Although 
Brady upheld § 3583(h) against an ex post facto challenge, 
that case only considered a situation where the underlying 
criminal conduct was a class A felony. The same analysis 
we employed in Brady compels the conclusion that there is 
an ex post facto violation here. 
 
For a class A felony, as was involved in Brady, 
§ 3583(b)(1) authorizes imposition of a term of supervised 
release of up to five years. Upon revocation of supervised 
release, § 3583(e)(3) authorizes imposition of a period of 
imprisonment of up to five years. Thus, for a class A felony, 
the (b)(1) cap on supervised release is no greater than the 
(e)(3) cap on imprisonment. Since both caps arefive years, 
§ 3583(h)'s predicating the length of the total package of 
revocation sentence on the (b)(1) cap on supervised release 
rather than on the (e)(3) cap on imprisonment makes no 
practical difference.3 Application of § 3583(h) to Brady 
meant that he could be sentenced to any combination of 
prison and supervised release up to a total package of five 
years, but this was no more severe a penalty than the five 
years of imprisonment to which he was subject prior to 
§ 3583(h). 
 
The statutory structure is quite different for class B, C, 
and D felonies, and so our conclusion with respect to these 
classes of felonies must differ as well. For class B, C, and 
D felonies, there is a discrepancy between the amount of 
supervised release authorized and the amount of 
incarceration that can be imposed. For class B felonies, 
§ 3583(b)(1) authorizes up to five years of supervised 
release, but § 3583(e)(3) allows only a maximum of three 
years of prison to follow revocation. Section 3583(b)(2) 
authorizes up to three years of supervised release for class 
C and D felonies but § 3583(e)(3) allows only two years of 
prison upon revocation. Since § 3583(h) ties the length of 
the total package to the length of supervised release 
permitted under § 3583(b), and since this length exceeds 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. The same is true for class E felonies, where (b)(1) authorizes a year of 
supervised release and (e)(3) authorizes a year of imprisonment. 
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the length of imprisonment authorized under § 3583(e), 
application of § 3583(h) allows imposition of a sentence two 
years longer than before for class B felonies (five years 
rather than three) and one year longer for class C and D 
felonies (three years as opposed to two).4  These lengthier 
periods of restricted liberty authorized under § 3583(h) 
mean that application of this provision impermissibly 
increases the punishment for those who commit class B, C, 
or D felonies. Brady in no way bars us from recognizing 
this fact. 
 
Finally, the government notes that if we remand for 
resentencing the district court will be free to impose up to 
24 months of imprisonment and speculates that Dozier will 
be displeased with a lengthier prison sentence even though 
he will avoid the 24 months of supervised release. However, 
Dozier's counsel assures us that Dozier is aware of this 
possibility and that he has chosen to press this appeal, as 
is his right. As the Seventh Circuit stated in a similar 
context, even if Dozier's appellate court triumph is but a 
"pyrrhic victory" which may "come[ ] at a price" to him, 
"[c]oncern for [Dozier] cannot expand a. . . court's power 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. We are aware that four circuits have found no ex post facto violation 
in retrospective application of § 3583(h) with regard to any class of 
felony. See United States v. St. John, 92 F.3d 761 (8th Cir. 1996); see 
also United States v. Johnson, 114 F.3d 1189 (Table), 1997 WL 327316 
(6th Cir. 1997); United States v. Wash, 97 F.3d 1465 (Table), 1996 WL 
536563 (10th Cir. 1996); United States v. Sandoval, 69 F.3d 531 (Table), 
1995 WL 656488 (1st Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 77 (1996). 
However, three of these circuits had, prior to § 3583(h), construed 
§ 3583(e) to permit imprisonment and supervised release. See United 
States v. O'Neil, 11 F.3d 292 (1st Cir. 1993); United States v. Schrader, 
973 F.2d 623 (8th Cir. 1992); United States v. Boling, 947 F.2d 1461, 
1463 (10th Cir. 1991), overruled by United States v. Rockwell, 984 F.2d 
1112 (10th Cir. 1993). Unlike in our circuit, therefore, enactment of 
§ 3583(h) did not alter the potential punishment in these three circuits. 
The final circuit to find no ex post facto violation treats the sentence 
imposed upon revocation of supervised release as having an existence 
entirely independent of the original criminal conduct, and therefore holds 
that application of a statute passed after the original criminal conduct 
but before the revocation of supervised release does not implicate the ex 
post facto prohibition. See United States v. Reese, 71 F.3d 582 (6th Cir. 
1995). 
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under the law." United States v. McGee, 981 F.2d 271, 276 
(7th Cir. 1992). On remand, the district court must 
resentence Dozier consistent with the sentencing authority 





Since Dozier did not raise an ex post facto objection to 
his sentence in the district court, we can only vacate his 
sentence if the ex post facto violation we have found 
constitutes plain error. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b) ("Plain 
errors or defects affecting substantial rights may be noticed 
although they were not brought to the attention of the 
court."). We conclude that it does. 
 
We engage in a four-step analysis to determine whether 
an error can be corrected on appeal despite not having been 
raised in the trial court. We ask (1) whether there was an 
error, (2) that was plain, i.e. "clear" or"obvious," (3) that 
affected substantial rights, and (4) that calls for the 
exercise of our discretion to take corrective action because 
the error creates a miscarriage of justice or seriously affects 
the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial 
proceedings. See United States v. Retos, 25 F.3d 1220, 
1228-32 (3d Cir. 1994) (deriving four steps from United 
States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732-37 (1993)). 
 
All four conditions are satisfied here. As we have 
explained, the district court's retrospective application of 
§ 3583(h) to sentence Dozier to a new term of supervised 
release was error. This error was plain because it is clear 
that imposing a total sentence of 30 months is a greater 
penalty than the 24-month maximum authorized prior to 
enactment of § 3583(h). There is no doubt that this error 
affects Dozier's substantial right of liberty, since it extends 
by at least six months the period during which his liberty 
is restricted and he is subject to governmental supervision. 
Imposing on the defendant a sentence that the law did not 
authorize at the time he committed his crime is a 
miscarriage of justice and seriously affects the fairness and 
integrity of judicial proceedings. Therefore, we will exercise 
our discretion and vacate the sentence as plain error. 
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IV. 
 
Retrospective application of § 3583(h) to those who 
committed class B, C, or D felonies prior to September 14, 
1994 increases the punishment that can be imposed on 
such defendants and is, thus, contrary to the constitutional 
prohibition on ex post facto legislation. Therefore, we will 
vacate Dozier's sentence and remand to the district court 
for resentencing consistent with this opinion. 
 
A True Copy: 
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